So what? Well, a 1973 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union — which received little attention when it was signed and has since been largely forgotten — is promising in the current environment. The US-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, signed during a period of US-Soviet détente – and admittedly more symbolic than substantial – called on both states to “eliminate the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons” and to “prevent the development of situations that could provoke a dangerous escalation of their relations”, which could lead to nuclear war. (c) commitments made by a Party to its allies or other countries in treaties, conventions and other appropriate documents. The agreement was originally presented to US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during his Soviet visit to Moscow in 1972.[4] Kissinger described the original project as “a dangerous Soviet maneuver to induce us to renounce the use of nuclear weapons, on which the defense of the free world ultimately depended. Given Soviet superiority in conventional weapons, such a move would demoralize our allies and deeply worry China, which it would see as a sign of the dreaded US-Soviet collusion. It was strong. We have been urged to dismantle NATO`s military strategy while proclaiming a virtual US-Soviet military alliance aimed at imposing our will on China or any other country with nuclear ambitions. [2] Guided by the objectives of strengthening international peace and security, aware that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for humanity, starting from the desire to create the conditions under which the risk of a nuclear war anywhere in the world would be reduced and ultimately eliminated, the United States and the Soviet Union agree in principle to: that an agreement must be reached to limit the fear and danger of nuclear war. Nuclear war between them and between one of the parties and other countries. The Agreement to Prevent Nuclear War[1] was created to reduce the risk of nuclear war between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The agreement was signed at the Washington Summit on 22 June 1973.

The United States and the USSR agreed to reduce the risk of nuclear war and establish a policy to curb hostility. The agreement to prevent nuclear war was signed by US President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev during Brezhnev`s visit to Washington in June 1973. The agreement contains few details, but reaffirms the common desire to avoid nuclear war or situations in which it could occur: everything discussed and agreed in this agreement will not affect or restrict Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, provisions of the Charter of the United Nations that deal with international peace and security. as well as other contracts, agreements and documents of one of the parties that have already cooperated with their allies. For Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and other Americans who participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the most important lesson was that U.S. cities ran an unbearable risk of absorbing a nuclear strike during a crisis because of the potential fog of miscalculations, miscalculations, or misunderstandings. The fear of nuclear war around Cuba has created new imperatives for policymakers. Crises must be avoided. Strategic stability – a situation in which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would have any reason to fear a nuclear first strike – must be established.

Gross nuclear parity must set the bar as high as possible for the use of nuclear power. The five countries could also agree to take a series of confidence- and security-building measures. This could include the exchange (at an unclassified level) of practices aimed at ensuring the security, security and effective control of nuclear weapons. Such an exchange could become a set of good practices for nuclear weapons owners. Smart goal, high hopes. In the 1960s, U.S. policymakers began to pursue a wise goal: to ensure that fewer fingers grasped the nuclear trigger. They have worked to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They reduced risk by seeking arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. The 1973 Convention for the Prevention of Nuclear War contains eight articles. They recognize that the objectives of the Parties to the Convention are to eliminate from international policy the risk of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. Some disarmament advocates, who reflect a human tendency to seek simple solutions to very complex problems, prefer a lunar approach – they want to ban nuclear weapons by treaty as a first step towards abolition.

For the United States, a nation with significant military responsibilities, the equation works the other way around: nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence as long as Washington`s military competitors possess them. It is an unpleasant fact of life in the United States that nuclear weapons are both protagonists and antagonists. They are both a guarantee for the security of the United States and a massive threat to it. Resolving this tension has been the profession of policymakers and scientists throughout the nuclear age, and the tension will certainly continue until the major powers have practically resolved their differences – and until the regional competitions that lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons are resolved. From the beginning of the SALT negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two countries began to reshape their relations on the basis of peaceful cooperation. One of the main objectives in this regard was to prevent wars, especially nuclear wars. At the last meeting of the Moscow Summit in May 1972, the countries exchanged some general ideas on how to achieve this goal. These discussions continued throughout the following year and were concluded by a formal agreement during Secretary-General Brezhnev`s visit to the United States from 18 to 25 June 1973. The agreement was reached during an official visit to the United States by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), on 18 and 25 June 1973, and during his meeting with US President Richard Nixon.

The document entered into force at the time of its signature and was closed indefinitely. Starting with the Glassboro summit — a meeting between President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin in New Jersey in 1967 — McNamara tried to convince the Soviets that limiting nuclear missiles and ballistic missile defense would provide the best protection against an unfettered arms race and nuclear war that neither side sought or wanted. Five years later, Richard Nixon – who continued the policy begun under the Johnson administration – signed a series of agreements with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, mainly SALT I and his first cousin, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 raised high hopes for the possibility of further major progress in disarmament. In fact, the landscape of the past two decades is close to nuclear achievements, cooperative threat reduction efforts that eliminated many of Russia`s strategic nuclear weapons withdrawn at New START, a treaty that brought U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals to historically low levels. Unfortunately, the tide has turned again under Putin. It is redoubling its efforts on nuclear weapons, probably to support a revanchist policy in the former Soviet space and to compensate for Russia`s conventional military inferiority compared to the United States and NATO. The new review of the United States` nuclear posture indicates that future arms control efforts should be judged by their ability to improve U.S. security.

Of course, this is the right measure. But There is little optimism about Russia`s behaviour about new arms control agreements. Moscow has violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. It engages in nuclear rhetoric that hits the chest and shows broader discontent with its place in the European security architecture. Nor should new ideas on arms control be expected to come from Beijing. On the basis of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations on peacekeeping, the renunciation of the threat or use of force and the prevention of war, and in accordance with agreements signed by one of the Parties, both parties could use the agreement as a further step as a basis for a new political understanding – a multilateral agreement, which also includes China, France and the United Kingdom (the nations which, together with Russia and the United States, form the five recognized nuclear powers under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) […].